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 Relatively recent status quo changing events within Europe (i.e. the Great Recession, the 
Eurozone Crisis, the Refugee Crisis, etc.) have created political rumblings which have threatened 
to overthrow established European governments. More specifically, this threat has been and is 
the current rise of European far right nationalist populist parties. These parties generally 
represent themselves as direct political and ideological opposition to the current governing body, 
and although there have been multiple occurrences when it comes to the rise of European far 
right nationalist parties, there is one case in particular that will act as a case study: The 
development of Italy’s modern day Lega party. Lega serves as a perfect and unique case study 
due to the multitude of approaches a right wing populist party can take. For example, the source 
of right wing populism can range from that of nationalism, to nativist, to regionalist, etc. Because 
of Lega Nord’s historical development, where the party began first as a regionalist populist party 
but then transitioned towards a more conventional European far right nationalist party, this case 
study allows one to analyze a multifaceted perspective of right wing populism.  
 With the case study of Lega Nord however, there is one facet that must and will be 
addressed throughout this thesis: the personality that these far right nationalist populist parties 
tend to project. More specifically, this personality is one that resonates with a disgruntled 
constituency that sees itself, rightly so at times, victimized by the current governing/ruling body. 
In the case of Lega Nord, the focus on who exactly are the ruling establishment actually shifts 
from the alleged Mezzorgiono-aligned Italian government, to the European Union. In addition to 
this, it must also be mentioned that this shift in antagonistic focus is actually concurrent with that 
of the party transformation from Lega Nord to Lega. 
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 Finally, in regards to the aforementioned personality of these far right populist parties, a 
crucial component is of course the figureheads/leaders of these parties. A charismatic and 
effective leader can propel a party’s messaging to new heights and expand the party’s base to an 
even greater constituency. This is exactly the case when observing the leader of Lega: Matteo 
Salvini. Matteo Salvini, with both his charisma and ‘man of the people’ demeanor that he 
portrays on social media, has been able to expand Lega’s umbrella towards the southern region 
of Italy, something once unimaginable during the time of Lega Nord. With all this being said 
however, before this thesis can begin to cover the specifics of this case study it is important to 
understand some of the fundamentals when it comes to populism and its application to a 
European far right ideology. 
What is Populism? 
In order to properly analyze Lega Nord’s development into Lega, we have to define what 
exactly is the European far right populism that these parties have used. The definition of what 
constitutes a European far right populist party is key to understanding just how they have been 
able to consolidate power within their own respective political arenas. Admittedly, the question 
of defining populism is complex and there are variations in both its application and definition. Is 
populism defined by its associated special organizations and characteristics (i.e. “assault on 
institutions, charismatic leadership, etc.”1)? Or is populism ideational, best defined by the central 
ideology it advocates? Within these contrasting definitions there exists an overlap which allows 
one to observe the most fundamental pillar of populism, one that will be used for the purposes of 
this thesis as its general identification. This fundamental pillar being the idea that society is 
                                                          





inherently broken up into two distinctive groups: ‘the people (us)’ vs. ‘the elite (them)’. This 
foundation is highlighted by the works of Cas Mudde, Takis Pappas, Catherine Fieschi, and 
Benjamin Moffitt.  
In his piece ‘The Populist Zeitgeist’, Cas Mudde claims that the inherent philosophy of 
populism is rooted in a realm of dichotomy. This dichotomy “considers society to be ultimately 
separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt 
elite’ and that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the 
people.”2  This expression of the general will, in the inherent view of populism, is morally and 
intellectually superior to that of the elite. Thus, there constitutes a collection of power and 
influence not within the elite, but rather within the will of the majority. Takis Pappas, while 
arguing that special organizations define populism in his ‘Populists in Power’ article, similarly 
claims populism “holds that society is split by a single overriding cleavage between the vast 
majority and a tiny elite, and that this cleavage is unbridgeable.”3 Takis Pappas goes one step 
further and attributes four interrelated and key characteristics: “1). a reliance on extraordinary 
charismatic leadership, 2) the ceaseless, strategic pursuit of political polarization, 3) a drive to 
seize control of state, and 4) the systematic use of patronage to reward supporters and crowd out 
the opposition.”4 All of these will play a key role in clarifying what is and is not considered 
populism later in this introduction. 
Catherine Fieschi in her piece ‘Populocracy: The Tyranny of Authenticity and the Rise of 
Populism’, describes European populism being associated with three main concepts:  
                                                          
2 Cas Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist,” Government and Opposition 39, no. 4 (2004): 541–63, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x. 
3 Pappas, “Populists in Power.” 
4 Pappas, “Populists in Power.” 
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“a divide between the people and the elite… [the second concept being] a betrayal by an 
elite, typically one that has a greater sense of allegiance to its own members than to the 
people or the nation… [and the third] is authenticity, [meaning] a politics rooted in 
instinct, rather than reason, “the politics of the gut.””5  
 The final point in particular is noteworthy because ‘the politics of the gut’ is indeed both a 
conceptual and pragmatic trait that is exhibited by a number of populist leaders. This type of 
‘politic’ allows one to “dismiss opponents as hypocrites and provides license to speak one’s 
mind without limits, to be direct to the point of shamelessness.”6 Such a direct approach is 
integral to the discourse populists engage in and will be analyzed further in depth. 
Finally, Benjamin Moffitt provides an interesting angle to what constitutes populism in 
his piece ‘The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political style, and Representation.’ Here 
Moffitt diverges from the typical perspective of populism being a sort of fixed ideology, strategy, 
discourse, or political logic. Rather, the argument is that contemporary populism has manifested 
itself into more of a “political style that is used by a wide range of actors across the world today. 
This approach stresses the performative aspects of populism and contextualizes populism’s 
position in the heavily mediatized and ‘stylized’ milieu of contemporary politics.” 7 Such a focus 
on the style of populism is integral to understanding the effects it has on the recipients of populist 
discourse. 
                                                          
5 Ben Hall, “Populocracy: The Tyranny of Authenticity and the Rise of POPULISM, by Catherine 
Fieschi,” July 15, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/9b89b9be-a49b-11e9-a282-2df48f366f7d. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Benjamin Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017), 28. 
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Within these definitions there exists an overlap which allows one to observe the most 
fundamental pillar of populism: this notion of ‘us vs them’ (us being the people, and them being 
the elites) which transcends political labels. Populism acts as a thin-centered ideology that “can 
be easily combined with very different other ideologies, including communism, nationalism or 
socialism.”8 An ideology that is personalized and enhanced with the presence of a charismatic 
leader who can serve as a focal point for the goals of their respective party. These goals usually 
translate into attacks on liberal institutions, play into the narrative of patronage politics, and 
serve to vilify the political and ideological opposition. 
Even with this overarching label however, due to the ‘flexible’ application of populism 
there is still a certain question that remains: who constitutes ‘the people’ and ‘the elite?’ The 
answer lies in the fact that modern populism is inherently context-dependent. More specifically, 
populism will define the people and the elite of a society based on who and what is the existing 
institutional power and the values within said society.  The far right in particular is culpable 
when it comes to utilizing the context-dependent nature of populism to further propagate its 
agenda. Because of this, populism will be examined through the lenses of the European far right 
and the common/conventional exclusionary politics that are used. 
European Nationalist Populism on the Far-Right & Regionalist Application 
One defining aspect when it comes to populism, as previously mentioned, is that as a 
thin-centered ideology it can be seen as a tool with flexible utility. Two particular ‘utilizations’ 
that will have to be observed before delving into this thesis’ case study are as follows: European 
far-right populism (with its common association to nationalism) and its possible application to 
                                                          




regionalism. European far-right populism, while rooted in the aforementioned foundation of 
populism, has a number of defining characteristics which set it apart. Arguably, the most 
impactful of these is how common populist rhetoric is intertwined with the traditional framework 
of the European far right.  
It is essential to briefly contrast the populist far right and the traditional far right, in order 
to understand how populist ideals distinguishes its’ approach to the far right. When observing the 
traditional far right, it is apparent that its foundational ideology is based in absolutism. This 
absolutism views that society should be, and is in fact, homogeneous in nature; thus, the 
traditional far right champions theories of exclusivism, nativism, nationalism, and a rejection of 
globalism. Where the difference lies between the traditional far right and the populist far right is 
the opportunistic and flexible nature that the populist far right can take. Again, this harkens back 
to the thin ideological framework of populism, where context dependency can morph the 
messaging of the respective far right populist actor. 
The connection between the traditional far right and the populist far right is with “the 
central populist frames (the people versus the elite) with the extreme right definition of the ‘us’ 
and the ‘them’, using a more traditional frame of the extreme right.”9 It is in this definition of the 
‘us’ and ‘them’ where one can begin to analyze what distinguishes subsets of populist parties 
                                                          
9 D. Della Porta, “Extreme Right and Populism: A Frame Analysis of Extreme Right Wing Discourses in 







from one another, in this case nationalist to regionalist. The most common form of populism that 
is used by the European far right is that which embraces a nationalist agenda. 
Nationalism emphasizes the prioritization of the nation by not only the people, but more 
importantly the state and its institutions. Much of the typical far right European parties, such as 
the National Rally in France or the AfD in Germany, utilize what can be best described as a 
subset of nationalism: nativism. Nativism is centered around the combination of nationalism 
“with xenophobia in that it calls for States to be comprised of only members of the native group 
and considers non-native elements to be fundamentally threatening to the monocultural nation-
state.”10 Such nativist tendencies by European Far Right parties tend to take an ethno-pluralist 
perspective, where any different culture is considered equal, “but distinct and thus 
incompatible… [they] celebrate cultural differences and argue that these differences must be 
protected from things like mass migration, cultural imperialism, and one-worldism.”11 This is 
characteristic of the rising far right European nationalist parties, including Lega, who have 
consistently thrown attacks on liberal, globalized institutions and mass migration. 
While on one side of the populist coin there is a nationalist application, for the purpose of 
this thesis the other side of the coin can show its regionalist counterpart. Regionalism is 
inherently an ideology that is founded off of the notion of ‘territory’. That is, regionalism looks 
to prioritize a government for and by the respective region, and hence the sovereignty of said 
region. From regionalism comes regionalist parties, like Lega Nord, that 
                                                          





“demand more regional power. [They] are neither organized on a nation-wide scale nor 
do they possess the ambition to represent the interests and people over, of and in the 
whole territory of a country. Regionalist parties are organized exclusively on a regional 
basis and aim to cater for a regional electorate only.”12  
Having this context, one can now begin to see that when populism is intermingled with 
regionalism there is a complement between regionalism and the common anti-system, anti-elite 
populist rhetoric. This complement between characteristics is achieved mainly through what was 
mentioned previously: an effective identification of an ‘elite’ that serves as a counterpart to the 
‘people or region’. To quickly exemplify this, the Lega Nord drew a dichotomy between 
themselves (Padania) and “the political and cultural elites running the country (to the benefit of 
the South)… [where] northern Italians could still save themselves, by regaining control.”13  
Where of course Padania is portrayed as the people, and the South and political establishment is 
painted as the elite. This served to enhance the regionalist ideology to an effective degree. 
Admittedly, there is some debate as to whether regionalist parties can fit under the 
populist label. For example, political scientists such as Takis Pappas argue that true modern 
populism is that which holds power and serve as a true foil to liberal democracy and 
democratically liberal institutions. As mentioned previously, Pappas believed that for modern 
populism to be characterized as such they must look to “seize control of the state, emasculate 
                                                          
12 Oscar Mazzoleni and Sean Mueller, “Regionalist Parties in Western Europe: Dimensions of Success,” 
Routledge & CRC Press (Taylor & Francis Group), accessed March 7, 2021, 
https://www.routledge.com/Regionalist-Parties-in-Western-Europe-Dimensions-of-Success/Mazzoleni-
Mueller/p/book/9781472477545. 
13 Daniele Albertazzi, “'No Regionalism Please, We Are Leghisti !' The Transformation of the Italian Lega 




liberal institutions, and impose an illiberal constitution.”14 This would seem at odds with the 
regionalist ideology, and hence contradict the labeling of the Lega Nord as a populist party. 
However, rather than defining populism through a conditionality of power, it has to be 
acknowledged that “populism is always partially constituted by aspects of the environment in 
which it finds itself.”15 Populism is not defined by its attainment and maintaining of power, but 
rather by the previously discussed inherent characteristics. Yes, its priorities as to who is the 
enemy and ally may change over time as the political environment around it changes. But the 
inherent, defining characteristic of populism (i.e. charismatic leadership, rhetoric, us vs. them, 
etc.) remains.  
Having analyzed these definitions, one thing is certain: European far right populism has 
manifested itself into a platform that is commonly empowered through its opposition to “mass 
immigration, cultural liberalization, and the perceived surrender of national sovereignty to 
distant and unresponsive international bodies.”16 And this is exactly the case we see with Lega 
Nord and the eventually formed Lega, the former who practiced regionalist populism and the 
latter being the transitioned nationalist populist party. We can now begin to answer the 
fundamental puzzle this thesis presents: how exactly was a far right regionalist party able to not 
only transition, but arguably also politically elevate itself, towards a more conventional European 
far right nationalist party. 
                                                          
14 Pappas, “Populists in Power.” 
15 Duncan McDonnell, “A Weekend in Padania: Regionalist Populism and the Lega Nord - Duncan 
McDonnell, 2006,” SAGE Journals, accessed March 7, 2021, 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9256.2006.00259.x. 
16 William A. Galston, “The Rise of European Populism and the Collapse of the Center-Left,” Brookings 





Broad Overview of Lega Nord and Lega: 
The Lega was formerly known as the Lega Nord, whose prior platform focused heavily, 
if not exclusively, on a regionalist agenda – one that sought to protect and prioritize the 
Padania’s (Northern Italy and parts of Central Italy) interests and potential from their southern 
counterparts (The Mezzogiorno). The Lega Nord eventually underwent some changes in scope 
and ideological focus. Arguably the first prominent shift was when Umberto Bossi, head of the 
Lega Nord, formed an alliance with Silvio Berlusconi, a prominent Italian politician and media 
figure. This was done in order to establish a governmental centre-right coalition between the 
Lega Nord and Berlusconi’s Forza Italia. Now while the alliance had obvious political benefits, 
the true significance lies in the effect it had on the Lega Nord’s ideological foundation. The 
alliance saw Bossi slowly shift the Lega Nord’s philosophy of “secessionism with federalism, 
though it never abandoned its regional roots or its formal pledge to lead its home area out of the 
Italian Republic.”17  
If there is any clear turning point in the Lega Nord’s philosophy it is with the 
appointment of Matteo Salvini after the resignation of Umberto Bossi (and a brief stint by 
Roberto Maroni) as Federal Secretary of the Lega Nord. Salvini’s victory in the closed primary 
elections can be seen as “the natural result of a process of party renovation, both in generational 
and ideological terms which was perhaps inevitable in order to turn the page.”18 This party 
                                                          
17  Roberto D’Alimonte, “How the Populists Won in Italy,” Journal of Democracy 30, no. 1 (2019): 114–
27, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2019.0009. 
18 Michelangelo Vercesi, “Owner Parties and Party Institutionalisation in Italy: Is the Northern League 






renovation began to distance the Lega Nord from its anti-southern rhetoric. Salvini demonstrated 
this in 2014 with his public apologies for comments he made throughout his political career that 
targeted the Mezzorgiono, claiming that he will prioritize Italy as a nation. This prioritization of 
course would focus on protecting Italy from total collapse and abuse. But who exactly did 
Salvini, and in turn the Lega Nord, accuse of seeking Italy’s destruction? This question would 
lead to the beginning of Salvini’s transformation of the party from “a northern league into a 
national league… [where] patriotism replaced regionalism, and Italy replaced Padania.”19 Salvini 
tapped into the aforementioned ‘us vs them’ populist mentality and expanded its scope to the 
point where he accused the EU of being the biggest threat to Italians. He argued that “even if it 
could go it alone, the North would still be the victim of regulations imposed by a ‘totalitarian’ 
EU and would also have to use a currency allegedly set up to advantage the German economy: 
the Euro.”20  The vilification of the EU gave Salvini the political capabilities to draw the party’s 
ire away from Rome and towards Brussels, in conjunction with security focused rhetoric as 
shown with Salvini’s increased focus on national issues. This is seen with increased mentions of 
“security, fear of crime, and immigration in the party’s political agenda… [resulting in] working-
class and low-education voters to support the nationalist] populist messages and anti-
globalization that the Lega Nord aimed to monopolize.”21  These changes of direction allowed 
Salvini to begin pursuing an expansion of the Lega Nord’s electorate base and power, as well as 
show the distinguishing facets of national populism. Not only that, but Salvini began to exhibit 
                                                          
19 D’Alimonte, “How the Populists Won in Italy.” 
20 Daniele Albertazzi, Arianna Giovannini, and Antonella Seddone, “‘No Regionalism Please, We Are 
Leghisti !’ The Transformation of the Italian Lega Nord under the Leadership of Matteo Salvini,” 
Regional &amp; Federal Studies 28, no. 5 (n.d.): 645. 
21 Gianluca Passarelli and Dario Tuorto, “The Lega Nord Goes South: The Electoral Advance in Emilia-




the common nativist-ethno-pluralist traits of an up and coming far right European populist party. 
Such a transition from regionalist to nationalist provides the opportunity to observe discrepancies 
and comparisons between these two approaches to populism.  
The Essential Question and Approach: 
The answer as to how regionalist-centric Lega Nord transitioned into nationalist nativist 
Lega lies in three main elements that will be both qualitatively and quantitatively analyzed. The 
first element is the vacuum of political and ideological direction within Lega Nord due to scandal 
and party degradation. The second component correlates with the use of the aforementioned ‘us 
vs them’ mentality that is all too common within European populism. More specifically, the use 
of Eurosceptic and xenophobic rhetoric that was sparked by the aforementioned influx of 
immigration and the consequential platform that was provided to charismatic leaders such as 
Matteo Salvini. Such charismatic leadership has created a direct relationship between Salvini and 
his supporters which has only served to galvanize Lega’s influence. The third and final element 
relates to Salvini’s particular savviness on social media in order to expand the aforementioned 
rhetoric. Observing and analyzing these three components will coalesce into answering the 
question as to how a regionalist populist party transitioned into a nationalist populist party, and 







The Lega Nord  
In order to properly engage with the aforementioned essential question of this thesis, the 
following section will be dedicated to analyzing the history of the Lega Nord. For the purposes 
of this thesis, this historical analysis will address the birth and rise of the Lega Nord, along with 
its evolution as a populist power. Such an analysis will provide essential context needed to 
answer crucial questions throughout this thesis. One such question is how exactly was a far right 
regionalist populist party able to not only transition, but arguably also politically elevate itself, 
towards a more conventional European far right nationalist party?  
Southernization of the Democratic Christian Party 
The precursor to the Lega Nord was what can best be described as a decentralized 
collection of six regionalist focused political coalitions who claimed to represent their respective 
regions of Northern and North-Central Italy. These coalitions included the Liga Veneta (Based in 
the Veneto region), Lega Lombarda (Based in the Lombardy region), Uniun Ligure (Based in the 
Liguria region), Lega Emiliano-Romagnola (Based in the Northern Emilian region), Alleanza 
Toscana (Based in the Tuscany region), and Piemont Autonomista (Based in the Piedmont 
region). The rise of these regional leagues was mainly a response to the number of both socio-
economic and political developments that Italy underwent in the 1970s and 80s. These 
developments mainly included an increasing alienation felt by businesses and citizens, of 
Northern and North-east Italy, from the mainstream Christian Democratic Party (DC). During 
this period, the DC underwent what was known as meridionalizzazione (“southernization”) 
where the political party sought to enhance and consolidate southern support in order to maintain 
political power.  
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This process of Southernization “antagonized voters, especially those located in former 
Christian Democratic strongholds within the Third Italy…. the Veneto and eastern Lombardy, 
regions that would become Lega strongholds, felt particularly alienated from the party.”22 This 
political and socio-economic alienation of Northern voters allowed for the first of the 
aforementioned leagues to electorally rise. For example, the Liga Veneta’s gain of 4.2% of the 
vote in the Veneto region demonstrated that: 
“there were latent forces within civil society that could be mobilized with the correct 
political message, charismatic leadership, and adequate organization… resentment 
towards the state resulted in demands for regional autonomy, articulated through an 
affirmation of local dialects and culture.”23 
This building resentment was focused within the lower middle class, small businesses, and the 
self-employed. Such resentment translated into electoral support for these aforementioned 
leagues, especially for the rising Lega Lombarda party and its leader Umberto Bossi.   
Lega Lombarda and Umberto Bossi 
 The Lega Lombarda party in particular played a critical role in the formation of the Lega 
Nord. Prior to the creation of the Lega Nord, the Lega Lombarda party had slowly been gaining 
political traction both in the Italian government and the EU. In 1987, under leader Umberto 
Bossi, the Lega Lombarda “captured seats in the national legislature and installed Bossi as 
senator. [Just] two years later the Lega Lombarda won representation in the European 
                                                          
22 Andrej Zaslove, The Re-Invention of the European Radical Right: Populism, Regionalism, and the 
Italian Lega Nord (Montreal, CANADA: MQUP, 2011), 55 
23 Ibid, 55 
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Parliament.”24 These political victories and clout empowered Bossi and his party. Furthermore, 
parallel to the Lega Lombarda’s rise came also the success of other regionalist league parties 
such as the Piemont Autonomista. These victories eventually resulted in Bossi “coalesce[ing] the 
other regionalist parties in northern Italy into a federated party structure that took the name Lega 
Nord (Northern League).”25  
With a Northern League established, regionalist interests were able to effectively 
undertake political and governmental mobilization in both the Italian and European legislature. 
This is seen with Bossi’s election to Italy’s Chamber of Deputies in 1992, which in turn resulted 
in greater party membership and eventually the Lega Nord becoming the second largest party in 
Northern Italy in 1992.26 Much of this success is attributable to two factors: the 
leadership/personality of Bossi, and the regionalist ideological base of the party. 
The personality of Umberto Bossi can best be labelled as charismatic, which in and of 
itself served to further the aspirations and goals of the Lega Nord through its regionalist populist 
discourse. Bossi contrasted himself from typical politicians by presenting himself as “an anti-
political figure, a man of the people.”27 This is not unlike many trends of populist parties where, 
according to Professor Takis Pappas, one of the reinforcing characteristics of populism is “a 
reliance on extraordinary charismatic leadership.”28 Bossi reflected this in his informal style of 
speech where agitation, emotion, and curtness took the forefront of his discourse. His physical 
                                                          
24 “Umberto Bossi | Biography, Politics, & Facts,” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed April 30, 2020, 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Umberto-Bossi. 
25 Robert Leonardi and Monique Kovacs, “The Lega Nord: The Rise of a New Italian Catch-All Party,” 
Italian Politics 8 (1993): 50–65. 
26 Ibid, 50-65 
27 Andrej Zaslove, The Re-Invention of the European Radical Right: Populism, Regionalism, and the 
Italian Lega Nord (Montreal, CANADA: MQUP, 2011), 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bu/detail.action?docID=3332232. 
28 Pappas, “Populists in Power.” 
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appearance played well into this narrative of anti-politics, where Bossi presented himself to 
supporters and the electorate with unkempt hair and casual dress wear. All of this served to 
reflect a greater populist shift with the Lega Nord, a changing of political platform, and “an 
accompaniment of new forms of political mobilization.”29 A political mobilization that sought to 
disrupt the status quo and establish a system of political authority and legitimacy for Padania. 
Evolution of Lega Nord’s Ideological Focus 
The Lega Nord’s success for the time came in conjunction with the aforementioned 
charismatic leadership, and arguably more important, it’s populist regionalist philosophy. But 
how exactly did the Lega Nord subscribe to what has been labeled as a regionalist ideology? The 
answer is that Lega Nord’s regionalist message and focus has shifted through what can be seen 
as three phases, which correspond with key political developments of the Lega Nord. More 
specifically, these three phases were as follows: 1. A focus on a Federalist northern state, 2. then 
a transition to secession based on Northern exceptionalism (Padania), and finally 3. a transition 
to devolution of political power from the Italian state. The evolution of Lega Nord’s messaging 
is key to explaining its eventual adoption of a nationalist European far right agenda. 
Prior to the formation of the Lega Nord, the aforementioned individual regional leagues 
focused on ethno-regionalism. Ethno-regionalism emphasizes protecting and maintaining the 
integrity of their respective local culture, dialect, and other ethno-regional aspects. However, 
with the creation of a unified party came the necessity of creating a unified movement. This 
unification was pushed by Lega Nord as “the autonomy of a Northern Republic within the 
confines of a federal state…The Lega Nord claimed that these regions were sufficiently distinct 
                                                          
29 Andrej Zaslove, The Re-Invention of the European Radical Right: Populism, Regionalism, and the 
Italian Lega Nord  
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in terms of culture, language, and economy to warrant radical reconstruction of the state.”30 Such 
an autonomy however, required a key component: consolidating any ethno-regionalist 
differences within northern Italy in order to create a unified northern state within Italy. This was 
particularly achieved through the Lega Nord tapping into their populist roots and emphasizing a 
new threat: Rome and the south.  
In 1994, in response to electoral losses caused by a brief adoption of center-right 
ideology, the Lega Nord began its second ideological phase: Padania and a need for secession 
from the Italian state. The Lega Nord focused its advocacy on defending and promoting the 
existence of what they called the Federal Republic of Padania – an administratively unofficial 
region that encompassed Northern and parts of Central Italy. According to the Lega Nord, 
Padania was destined for greatness and a secessionist movement would enable the Republic of 
Padania to not only excel, but to also rediscover their historical roots as a united region. 
Historical roots based on a “common bond born of open and democratic communities, a 
commitment to autonomy, and deeply rooted democratic traditions.”31 Such linking of the North 
through a shared democratic history was particularly significant in that it provided a platform of 
legitimacy for the Lega Nord and for their conceived notion of Padania. 
Yet in addition to the aforementioned democratic linkage, there was also present an 
alleged shared ancestral history that justified the existence of Padania. This ancestry hails back 
from the early 9th century settlers of central Europe, to the regions of Central Europe that once 
belonged to Austrio-Hungarian empire. According to leadership of the Lega Nord, this area of 
                                                          
30 Andrej Zaslove, The Re-Invention of the European Radical Right: Populism, Regionalism, and the 
Italian Lega Nord 
31 Ibid, 95 
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Miteleuropa “is the natural market of our area [and has] common traditions, cultures, and 
mentalities.”32 , where it has  
“influence[d] the physical traits of the Padani and ha[s] left the heritage of attachment to 
local autonomies and the underlying aspiration to freedom. [Those in the South] are in 
fact heirs to the Etruscan, Greek, and Italian populations stationed first in the 
Mediterranenan basin… therefore [Italy is] cut into two ethnic roots.”33  
Not only did this look to unite the people of the North as the Padani, but it also furthered the 
narrative of Northern exceptionalism and differentiation from their southern counterparts. 
 Historical roots were also utilized by creating a linkage through shared culture and 
tradition, more specifically a tradition of liberty/autonomy. From 1167’s Oath of Pontida, 
where “the communes of the North of Italy [stood] against the expansionistic intentions of the 
Roman-German emperor Federico Barbarossa,”34 to Alberto da Giussano’s victory against 
Barbarossa in the battle of Legano of 1176, such events were used to promote an agenda of 
secession. This was taken to such great lengths that even da Giussano’s figure, a medieval 
warrior raising a broadsword to the sky, became the symbol of the Lega Nord. 
 The agenda of secession was further exacerbated with the Lega Nord’s focus on the 
alleged detrimental influence of their southern neighbors. Initially, the rhetoric of anti-unification 
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focused on Italy’s 19th century unification known as Risorgimento, where Bossi and the Lega 
Nord claimed that “the unified State post-Risorgimento was a military construction at the 
expense of old territorial entities that were based on centuries-old autonomies and freedoms.”35 
Bossi also claimed that such a military construction is in actuality an example of a historical 
continuity. In other words, they claim that the Italian State has never really changed and it is the 
“same old State, untouched from the Risorgimento to the liberal period, and from fascism to the 
Republic.”36  
The Lega Nord also demonized southerners for their alleged incompetence and laziness, 
accusing them of conspiring against the economic and societal success of the North. However, 
they soon linked their “anti-southern stance with its fundamental anti-partyocracy attitude than to 
any primordial motivation.”37 The Lega Nord argued that southerners were intrinsically part of 
the Italian ‘system’, where southerners are often employed by the government and by 
consequence have played a role in the disruption of northern society. As is typical of populist 
parties, the Lega Nord accused the Italian government of corruption and party dominance over 
the realm of politics and socio-economics. Such dominance allegedly benefited the Mezzogiorno 
and crippled the economic capacity and opportunities of Padania. This is seen with the “rhetoric 
denounce[ing] the central government as “Roma ladrona” (Rome the thief), a nest of corrupt 
elites allegedly bent on exploiting hardworking northerners.”38 By doing this, the Lega Nord 
granted itself the opportunity to be the answer to a growing number of disgruntled northern 
                                                          








voters. This was further exemplified with the Lega Nord’s approach to immigration, where they 
alleged that it was the failure of the state to police borders that consequently allowed immigrants 
to harm the economy of the North. Such actions are emblematic of the combative element of ‘us 
vs. them’ that is all too common in populist parties.  
In addition to the ideological shift of the Lega Nord, the party also enacted a number of 
institutional changes within both the party and region in order to reinforce the existence of 
Padania. For example, in 1995, Umberto Bossi “announced the opening of the parliament of the 
north in Mantua [and] in 1996, the parliament changed its name to the Parliament of Padania and 
the party was renamed the Lega Nord for the Independence of Padania.”39  Such actions, 
although mainly symbolic in nature, served to emphasize the institutionalization and construction 
of the nation of Padania.  
However, the secessionist platform of Lega Nord was eventually abandoned. This failure 
can be attributed to the rather poor reception that the concept of Padania received from not only 
the electorate, but also the business sector. A poll conducted in 1998 for the magazine LiMes 
“indicated that 68.9% of northerners considered separation to be unacceptable/disastrous.”40 
Such poor reception forced Bossi and the Lega Nord to moderate the party’s message, and thus 
began the third phase of Lega Nord’s ideological transformation: devolution. Lega Nord and 
their agenda of devolution, rather than exclusively focusing on separating from the Italian state, 
sought to decentralize power and influence over policies such as healthcare, education, etc. away 
from the Italian state (particularly the south). Devolution provided a platform that allowed the 
Lega Nord to not only distinguish itself from other emerging political parties, but also maintain 
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its intrinsic primary message of syphoning governing power away from the south. This shift in 
ideological focus was sparked with Bossi’s decision in 2001 to join La Casa Delle Libertà 
(House of Freedoms), a centre-right political alliance led by Silvio Berlusconi. 
In truth, while ideological transitions within the party itself were crucial to Lega Nord’s 
evolution, another important factor was the restructuring of the Italian party system. A great 
example of this is seen with the governmental electoral system’s transition from pure 
proportional to a Mixed Member Majoritarian (running concurrently from the First to the Second 
Republic). The  
“implementation of a partial first-past-the-post voting system meant that it was 
strategically advantageous for the Lega [Nord] to join forces with Forza Italia… the Lega 
[Nord] was now forced to contend with political competition from Forza Italia and MS1, 
they could no longer portray itself as the sole opposition to the corruption of the First 
Republic.”41 
The changing of party structure prompted the Lega Nord to shift their focus from northern 
exceptionalism/regionalism to that of “economic and cultural protectionism… as well as to the 
consolidation of its support among the working class and among voters fearful of economic, 
social, and cultural decline.”42 This is of course in addition to the increasing influence of EU 
integration and globalization that had accelerated the evolution of Lega Nord into Lega. 
It is these modifications with party philosophy and structure where one begins to see a 
slow, but ever present, change of an exclusivist regionalist populist party to a federally focused 
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nationalist party. However, this transformation could never have been completely achieved with 
Bossi at the helm of the Lega Nord—as much of the ideological and political direction of the 
Lega Nord was dictated by the leadership of the party itself. Umberto Bossi was first and 
foremost a proponent of Northern Italian sovereignty; which helps explain why Lega Nord 
adopted this regionalist ideology. However, this all changed with Bossi’s resignation from the 
Lega Nord. In 2012, judicial investigations found “that taxpayers’ money earmarked for his party 
had been spent on improvements to his house and favours for members of his family.”43 This 
scandal was perpetrated by the party’s treasurer, Francesco Belsito, who was subsequently 
charged with fraud, embezzlement, and money laundering. These developments dealt a major 
blow to the party that painted itself against the corruption of government, as seen through the 
Lega Nord “[losing] more than 50% of its consensus [in the May 2012 administrative election] 
when compared to the 2010 regional election.”44 The vacuum in leadership provided the 
opportunity of new leadership for the Lega Nord, and in turn a subsequent transformation of the 
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From Lega Nord to Lega 
Maroni interim term 
 With Umberto Bossi’s resignation came the necessity of new leadership for the wounded 
Lega Nord. The “political and judicial events involving the so-called ‘magic circle’ (il cerchio 
magico)”45 essentially streamlined the rise of new leadership. Roberto Maroni, who was 
effectively the second in command of the Lega Nord, was elected to be the next federal secretary 
of Lega Nord at the Assago forum of 2012. Maroni’s term as federal secretary is one that was 
tasked with sparking the rebuilding effort of the Lega Nord. Maroni constructed a coalition that 
consisted of figures such as Matteo Salvini (elected secretary of Lega Lombarda) in order to 
further develop Lega Nord. As previously mentioned, the events of the Belsito scandal sparked a 
major downturn in electoral support for the party as seen through the Lega Nord’s drastic defeat 
in the 2013 general elections (gained 4.1% of the vote). However, one particular victory that 
Maroni achieved was of great significance: The 2013 regional elections in Lombardy saw 
Roberto Maroni elected as President. This eventually resulted in Lega Nord once again 
establishing a political foothold within a significant portion of Northern Italy. 
Salvini’s rise to leadership 
The relative instability and vulnerability of the Lega Nord presented the opportunity for 
both a new ideological and organizational structure to take hold. More specifically, in 2013 
Maroni announced his resignation as federal secretary and prompted a special election to take 
place. Of the multitude of candidates pursuing the federal secretary position, two presented a 
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legitimate chance of attaining said position: Secretary of Lega Lombarda Matteo Salvini, and 
previous Lega Nord Federal Secretary Umberto Bossi. Matteo Salvini, having secured the 
endorsement of Maroni and other leading members of the party, defeated Bossi’s bid for federal 
secretary with a margin of 82% to 18% in the closed primary. 
While Matteo Salvini’s leadership and rhetoric will be further analyzed later in this 
thesis, one cannot overlook his effect on the party as a whole. The election’s drastic repudiation 
of who was once a revered leader of the Lega Nord served as a symbol of the shifting ideological 
foundation of the party. More specifically, it demonstrated that Lega Nord’s primary ideology 
had undergone a radicalization that laid the groundwork for Matteo Salvini’s nationalism. One 
such example of this radicalization could be seen back in 2001 where “9/11… helped justify 
radicalizing the party’s position from being critical of how immigration had been managed by 
successive governments, to framing it as an existential threat to the very survival of the identities 
and cultures of northern Italians.”46 This, compounded with the ideological and power vacuum 
left through Bossi’s and Maroni’s resignation, demonstrated a process of party renovation 
through both generational and ideological means. A renovation that would have lasting political 
and societal consequences for both country and nation. 
 Once elected as federal secretary, Salvini made the conscious effort of distancing himself 
and the party from previous regionalist aligned rhetoric and policies. According to Salvini’s 
biographer, Alessandro Franzi, early on Salvini came to the conclusion that 
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“independence was not people’s main problem. He understood that people were fighting 
against globalization, inequality, migration, unemployment, and he understood that if he 
wanted to get more votes, he had to speak to all the Italians, not just the northern Italian 
citizens.”47 
By highlighting an alleged common, existential threat to all Italians, Salvini was able to 
accomplish two crucial steps: provide a platform for reconciliation between party and the 
Mezzogiorno, and align the party more with other conventional European far right forces; thus, 
moving the party further towards nationalism rather than regionalism. This messaging was of 
course enhanced by Salvini’s conciliatory rhetoric towards southerners, where in his early 
speeches he both claimed that “either Italy saves itself as a nation, or else all of its regions, 
without exception, will face ruin,”48 and apologized for previous anti-southerner rhetoric he 
made. Salvini’s decision to abandon the narrative of regionalism was momentous for the party, 
as it explicitly demonstrated his goal for Lega Nord: “to become a true national force and ally 
with other ultra-right groups in a common fight against ‘the enemies of all Italians’: illegal 
immigration, the European Union, and the economic crisis.”49 In the eyes of Salvini, and in turn 
the party, the European Union/Euro/immigrants was the true existential threat to the sovereignty 
of not only the North, but also the Italian nation. 
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 With the Lega Nord’s antagonism shifting from the South to the European establishment, 
a number of changes occurred for the Lega Nord that solidified the transition from regionalism to 
nationalism. In the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis, Euroscepticism was rapidly gaining traction 
in the European political sphere (as seen through increased support for Eurosceptic parties). 
Sensing this trend, Salvini created alliances with other Eurosceptic nationalists within the 
European parliament, including Marine Le Pen. These alliances, along with an ideological shift 
of the party, culminated in the 2014 European parliament elections. Here, rather than running on 
a ticket of Northern independence/sovereignty, the Lega Nord ran on a Basta Euro (Stop the 
Euro) ticket, which not only emphasized Euroscepticism but also specifically targeted the alleged 
detriment of the ‘German-benefiting Euro.’ Such direction resulted in a net positive electoral 
result when compared to the dismal performance of the Lega Nord in 2013 (at the height of the 
Belsito scandal). In 2014, the Lega Nord gained 6 Members of the European parliament (MEPs) 
while under the Europe of Nations and Freedom Group, and obtained victories within local 
regional coalitions in the North once again. 
 Such momentum resulted in further expansion of Lega Nord’s political focus of Italy as a 
nation. This was particularly seen in July of 2014 where “Salvini clarified the strategic 
implications of this change of direction, by hailing the forthcoming creation of ‘one or more 
movements’ across the whole of Italy.”50 This movement across Italy was best personified during 
the Emilia-Romagna regional election of 2014 where, within an area that predominantly 
supported the Democratic Party (Partito Democratico, PD), the Lega Nord won roughly 20% of 
the vote. These victories prompted the creation of a sister party known as the NcS (‘Noi con 
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Salvini – Us with Salvini). The NcS focused itself on the subnational elections in the southern 
and central regions of Italy through the same adopted Eurosceptic, ‘us vs. them’ mentality of 
Salvini’s Lega Nord.  All of these developments eventually led to the decision by Salvini to 
persuade the federal council of the Lega Nord to rename the party as just ‘Lega’ (with vehement 
opposition from conservative party hardliners, including Bossi). Dropping the ‘North’ 
accomplished two particular goals in regards to the transition to a populist nationalist party: 1. A 
further separation from the regionalist agenda that originally birthed the Lega Nord. 2. 
Empowered Matteo Salvini by “strengthening the personalization process [of the party] by 
adding his name on the logo of the party as its candidate for the premiership (i.e. Lega Salvini 
Premier).”51 In addition to this, the rebranded party continued to expand their outreach to the 
south by nixing NcS and replacing their sister party with another parallel party under the same 
label: ‘Lega per Salvini Premier’ (LSP). 
2018 Italian General Election and the Yellow Green Coalition 
 Under a new party label and ideological focus, the upcoming 2018 general elections 
would be consequential in legitimizing the Lega as a relatively newly formed nationalist political 
force. It was apparent that the  
“debate around the 2018 general election accelerated the pace of a change that was 
affecting the LN’s ideology… hence the increased focus on immigration, identity 
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issues and law and order… shelving of calls for regional autonomy for northern Italy, 
and a distinct focus on the national dimension.”52  
For this election, Lega formed a center-right alliance with two other conservative parties: Fratelli 
d’Italia and Forza Italia. On March 4, 2018, the Italian parliamentary elections were held and the 
results for both the populist movement and Lega were nothing short of outstanding. While the 
center-left suffered an electoral defeat, the aforementioned center-right coalition attained the 
highest vote total at 37% for the Chamber of Deputies and 37.5% for the Italian Senate. More 
importantly, with their “nationalist, anti-immigrant [agenda], the Lega outperformed the more 
moderate Forza Italia” with a margin of more than 3% of the vote for Lega in both the Chamber 
and the Senate.53 The results of the 2018 elections saw Lega win a plurality within both 
chambers of the Italian government, along with the Italian government resulting in a hung 
parliament. 
 With no one coalition having a majority and political gridlock being widespread, the 
Lega sought to further its political influence by attaining said majority. Through collaboration 
between Salvini and M5S’ Luigi Di Maio, it was decided that a joint cabinet would be 
established under the leadership of university professor Giuseppe Conte. Thus was born the 
‘Yellow-green coalition’/’government of change’ which was a joint cabinet consisting of 
primarily both Lega and the Five Star Movement (M5S). There was little agreement when it 
came to policy between these two parties, where Lega was focused on “stemming migration 
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flows into the country and cutting taxes, [while] the 5 star [focused] on expanding the social 
safety net and radically reforming Italy’s sclerotic political system.”54 However there was one 
shared trait: “a general contempt for the EU”55 through populist means that would serve as the 
foundational basis of this coalition. Italian Prime Minister Conte put it best when he stated that 
his populist, anti-establishment government is populist “if populism is the attitude of the ruling 
class to listen to the people’s needs… [and] if anti-system means aiming at introducing a new 
system able to remove old privileges and encrusted power.”56 The significance of the 
establishment of this coalition is that the ideological populist roots of the Lega (and of course the 
M5S) were now being both implemented and reinforced by a ruling Italian government. This is 
best exemplified by Matteo Salvini’s appointment as both Deputy Prime Minister and Minister 
of the Interior. What is particularly interesting about this coalition is the nature of populism that 
the M5S was rooted in. Rather than root its populist ideology on the traditional political spectrum 
(as the Lega has done with the far-right), the M5S exclusively focuses its messaging on anti-
system rhetoric. The coalition would play a significant role in the development of populism for 
both the party and country, a role that will be covered in a further analysis of Salvini and his 
influence on the Lega. 
2019 Italian Government Crisis & Lega’s Current State of Affairs 
 Having a drastic dichotomy in political vision between both the Lega and the M5S 
admittedly led to a number of boiling issues throughout the governing coalition’s 14-month 
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tenure. These included issues such as allegations of Salvini’s Lega taking financial assistance 
from Vladimir Putin, to conflict between the construction of a Lyon-Turin railroad project. The 
latter in particular served as the spark to the 2019 Italian governmental crisis, where Lega’s 
valued rail project was derailed by M5S’ votes to block construction. In addition to these inter-
party conflicts, the Lega and Salvini found themselves gaining more and more electoral support. 
This was best exemplified in the 2019 European Parliament election where Lega “took one third 
of the Italian vote… and turned around the balance of power between the [Lega and M5S].”57  
All of this, along with an apparent ambition of Salvini to vie for power, resulted in 
Salvini renouncing the M5S coalition, filing a vote of no confidence against Conte, and forcing 
the need for a snap election. Salvini hoped to consolidate his electoral and political power by 
ousting M5S and making Lega the majority party (further boosted by increasing public support 
throughout the coalition’s tenure). However, Salvini “failed to take into account the possibility 
that Five Star and the Democratic Party would overcome their reciprocal hatred and join forces 
inside Parliament to stop him.”58 The M5S agreed to form a coalition with the Democratic Party 
in order to prevent Salvini’s rise to power and appointed Giuseppe Conte as the Prime Minister 
once again, resulting in an outmaneuvering of the populist leader. 
 This now leaves the Lega in an interesting situation, where they now find themselves as 
the opposition to the majority government. However, recent developments show that Matteo 
Salvini and the League may have an opportunity to regain a majority government. As of early 
January of 2021, the “former prime minister Matteo Renzi [has] withdrawn his Italia Viva party 
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from the country’s ruling coalition.”59 This resignation being the result of politically focused 
clashes, the governing coalition now finds itself lacking a necessary parliamentary majority. 
Unless Giuseppe Conte can secure and pass a vote of confidence/President Mattarella forming a 
new coalition, “the opposition, which is made up of the League, its fellow far-right partner, 
Brothers of Italy, and Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, could potentially secure more than 50% of 
the vote.”60 However in February of 2021, after continued failed efforts to form a new 
government, President Mattarella summoned Mario Draghi (former president of the European 
Central Bank) to form a new technocratic government. This new government has seen 
widespread support and vote of confidence from the Five Star Movement, Lega, Forza Italia, the 
Democratic Party, and the Italia Viva party. In the context of Lega, “Salvini’s endorsement of 
Draghi marks a potential sea change for the League, shunting it out of the far-right, Eurosceptic 
camp and into the moderate, centre right.”61 What will happen remains to be seen, but more 
analysis into the current situation will be provided in the conclusion of this thesis. 
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With the Lega Nord’s shift away from regionalism, the following question arises: how 
was Salvini capable of transforming the foundational and electoral base of the Lega Nord? Much 
like Umberto Bossi, Salvini’s success has come from his effective communication strategies. 
Salvini has had the benefit of implementing his populist messages through his joint efforts on 
Facebook, his tenure as the Minister of the Interior, and in person efforts such as rallies and 
speeches. As Minister of the Interior, Salvini pushed for policies and actions that worked against 
assisting the EU and pro-immigrant efforts. Salvini worked “against NGOs rescuing migrants at 
sea and taking them to Italian ports.”62 In the eyes of voters, his actions showed that he was 
capable of following up his promises with action. This heavily contrasts with the all too common 
disillusionment that is associated with traditional Italian politicians. One controversial instance 
of this occurred in 2018, when Salvini turned away “a boatload of more than 600 African 
refugees on a ship named Aquarius operated by the not-for-profit organization SOS 
Méditerranée, which rescues people stranded at sea trying to reach Europe.”63 Salvini’s actions 
has led to him being criticized by the European Union, which in turn has allowed him to “appear 
as the leader that Italy needs to protect its interests at the EU level.”64  
Communication Strategies: Speeches and Rallies 
 In order to effectively portray himself as a man of the people, Matteo Salvini has tailored 
his rhetoric (in both his speeches and rallies) in order to tap into a collective frustration of the 
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people. More importantly, Salvini does this in a way that stokes rather than assuages the Lega’s 
constituency’s anger towards immigrants, the EU, and the establishment. His rhetoric reflects 
this, as Salvini consistently applies negative connotations when it comes to the functioning of the 
EU, of immigrants, and other nations that work to oppose his nativist populist ideals. This is seen 
on both the international and domestic stage.  
In the case of the former, three speeches given by Salvini during the 8th parliamentary 
term of the European parliament will be briefly examined. The first is Salvini’s response to the 
Hungarian situation in 2017, where Hungary’s Parliament had approved a new education law 
that had called for the relocation of the Central European university out of the country. In his 
response to this situation, Salvini claimed that “while the terrorists shed blood in Europe, [the EP 
is] concerned with prosecuting Hungary – Mr. Orban, hold on – [the EP is] dealing with the 
rights of the Roma, the fake refugees, the billions of Soros and NOT a legitimately elected 
government.”65 To label this comment as scathing would be a gross understatement. While using 
a facetious tone towards the EP, Salvini successfully peddles the narrative of ‘fake’ refugees and 
a Soros conspiracy being the true threat, not Hungary’s education law. Salvini goes on to draw 
blatant comparison between the EU and the Soviet Union, going so far as to say “that some 
Europeanists of today who cheer Europe and cheer Macron… [cheered] when the Soviet tanks 
invaded Hungary… instead of tanks you use banks, finance, and an invasion of fake refugee 
immigrants.”66 What Salvini accomplishes here is to further promulgate rhetoric which serves to 
delegitimize international actors such as the European Union. 
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The second speech was made during the parliamentary debate in regards to an EU 
response of hate speech, populism, and specifically fake news on social media. This speech in 
particular is significant in that Salvini taps into classic populist rhetoric through the use of 
cultural and popular media. To be more specific, Salvini asks if the EU is  
“trying to control brains, trying to control the newspapers, the radio, the media… are you 
going to gag Facebook, the Internet, gag 50 million people?! You want to invent George 
Orwell’s Ministry of Truth, the Ministry of Propaganda! I expect the European Parliament 
to pay the psychological police to investigate the psychological crimes of those who are not 
aligned with the single though and the single currency!”67 
Also seen in the first speech, Salvini associates the EU with corrupt and dystopian-like 
institutions. In this case, the comparison is drawn between the EU and the infamous Ministry of 
Truth from George Orwell’s famed novel 1984. Essentially, Salvini is framing the EU and their 
actions as comparable to those of a secret police that looks to control the actions and suppress the 
liberty of the common people; thus, Salvini continues to effectively espouse the ‘us vs. them’ 
narrative. 
 The third and final speech that will be examined is Salvini’s input, on October 25th 2017, 
in the EU’s topical debate on illegal immigration and human trafficking in the Mediterranean. 
Salvini condemns the lack of action taken by the European establishment in curbing illegal 
immigration, especially the immigration of alleged “slaves, slackers, and/or thugs.”68 Salvini 
goes further by saying that immigration be done through legal and positive immigration quotas 
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“for those men and women who really bring added value to our societies… from the countries 
closest to our values, and I am thinking of countries with a Christian culture.”69 Through this 
glorification of Christianity, and subsequent vilification of the Islamic faith, Salvini is furthering 
the xenophobic rhetoric that has become a staple of the nativist populist Lega party. 
 Now while the aforementioned speeches deal with Salvini’s rhetoric on an international 
level, this also translates on domestic affairs as well. Salvini is very effective when it comes to 
rallies and fermenting anger against his party’s enemies. In 2015 for example, a Lega Nord 
protest was held at the Piazza del Popolo led by Salvini himself. This protest aimed to fight 
against both austerity and pro-immigration policies, while also looking to rally against then 
prime minister Matteo Renzi. What Salvini proclaimed to his followers exemplifies his 
perception: “The problem isn’t Renzi, Renzi is a pawn, Renzi is a dumb slave, at the disposal of 
some nameless person who wants to control all our lives from Brussels.”70 Salvini goes on to 
further say that he wants to change Italy, one to where “the Italian economy [will] be able to 
move forward again, something that is obstructed by Brussels and mad European policies.”71 
While the aforementioned rally in the Piazza del Popolo looked to vilify the European 
establishment, the 2019 Pontida Rally shows how Salvini and his party looked to target 
immigration in their efforts to propagate the ethno nativist populist message. More specifically, 
Salvini looked to attack the then recent acceptance of a French charity ship into the port of 
Lampedusa. This ship had saved 82 refugees from Libya, and in response Salvini claimed that he 
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“think[s] that immigration is going to be grim in the months ahead. It is going to get bad… the 
Italian people [cannot] be slaves to anyone.”72 It is apparent that the strategy that Salvini utilizes, 
as seen on both the domestic and international stage, is to antagonize the European establishment 
and vilify immigrants; thus, proliferating the us vs them mentality of right wing populism. 
Communication Strategies: Social Media 
On social media, Salvini makes the conscious effort of practicing one particular populist 
trait: appearing as a man of the people, thus connecting with constituents on a level that 
traditional politicians are allegedly incapable of. To say that Salvini is skilled in this aspect of 
outreach would be an understatement. Salvini’s “Facebook account has [4] million followers, 
and more engagement---that is, comments and reactions---than Trump’s, according to 
CrowdTangle, an analytics tool owned by Facebook.”73 Salvini has achieved this milestone by  
adopting a highly informal style of communication while coupling his populist messaging with 
inclusive, and personal language. He refers to his more than 4 million followers as brothers or 
sisters, as family; thus, he continues to tap into the populist playbook of connecting directly with 
the people. He posts about his private, personal life while using informal style of dress and 
communication. By doing all of this, Salvini’s, and in turn Lega’s, social media presence has 
helped to “shape (and, indeed, dominate) national debates on issues concerning identity, 
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immigration, and law and order, as the controversial remarks made via [social media] accounts 
are immediately picked up by the press and television news.”74 
The example below perfectly shows this, where an informal, personal touch is achieved 
through his style of clothing and indulgence in local delicacies. Furthermore, Salvini even takes a 
swipe at his opponents and democratic institutions with the following comment: “I could not 
leave the beautiful Catania, after the meeting on the earthquake in the Prefecture and an hour 
walk in the city centre among the people, without trying at least one arancino with meat sauce! 
What do you say, the PD will attack me?”75    
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 Another perfect example comes with a more recent post from Salvini in regards to the 
Italian Recovery Plan in response to the Covid pandemic. As seen below, the post is translated as 
such:  
     “One million Italian farmers mocked by the government, in the Recovery Plan, less than 2 
billion Euros are expected in the next few years to support sustainable agriculture, less than 
the amount that came from Europe before Covid. Shame! With the wine, sausages, oil, 
fishing and agritourist sectors in crisis, eating, drinking, and buying Italian is a duty 
 
Here Salvini is directly attacking the actions of the majority government/establishment while 
victimizing and venerating the Italian public, especially his followers. The victimization in 
particular implies that the elitist Italian government and European establishment are looking to 
hamper common people, thus perpetuating the ‘us vs them’ rhetoric. This post of course is 
further supplemented by the accompanying picture, which shows Matteo Salvini smiling and 
holding Italian made products close to him. One particular aspect of this photo that should be 
acknowledged is that it follows the trend of Salvini “posting videos/[photos] where he holds the 
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phone himself, a pose that’s not entirely flattering and shows his bearded chin, now flecked with 
gray, but that lets him speak directly to the people.”76  
 To call Salvini an expert when it comes to effectively applying the dichotomy between 
charismatic amicability and borderline bigotry would be an understatement. Nothing shows this 
better than the following post: 
 
At face value, one can see two defining features of this post: one of course is the bib around the 
baby which is marked with the words ‘STOP INVASIONE’, which translates to ‘STOP THE 
INVASION.’ Of course the second feature is the teddy bear wearing a Lega headband. What this 
post achieves is remarkable as it “invoked tenderness and empathy while contributing to the 
representation of a community in which family values are central.”77 To add to this however, the 
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post also accomplished associating an anti-immigrant messaging with something as pure as a 
baby. Salvini’s comment on his post is even more telling to this point as he states that “even 
Alessia [name of the baby] from Calavino says #stopinvasione.”78 These social media posts are 
crucial to Salvini’s strategy as it is his main point of contact between not only his constituency, 
but also the public as a whole. 
 With the connection established between himself and the people, Salvini then utilizes an 
algorithmic operation and software known as “The Beast” in order to balance both the positive 
messaging of his personal life, and conflict-driven, tension-heightening focus. It is a meticulous 
algorithm which cleverly mixes positive and negative emotions in order to further Lega’s 
messaging platform. The positive messaging is conveyed through the forms mentioned in the 
previous paragraphs, yet the negative messaging is a bit more intuitive. More specifically, this 
software functions by focusing on three main goals: “immediately occupy the media space… 
polarize the whole discussion around pro-Salvini and anti-Salvini… [and] launch strong 
messages, squeeze out of the public opinion its negative feelings so as to lower the guard of 
those who listen.”79 Salvini consequentially associates these negative public opinions with issues 
such as immigration, Italian security, and loss of control through EU intervention and 
globalization. Furthermore, Salvini has been able to ferment this notion of a united community 
that can mobilize both in his defense and as proponents of his idea across various platforms. 
 The application of these nationalist populist strategies has resulted in electoral gains for the 
party. An example of this success is seen in both recent general and regional Italian elections. 
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Under a centre-right coalition, the Lega had a strong performance and outperformed Berlusconi’s 
Forza Italia party in the 2018 General Elections. This performance resulted in the Lega gaining 
17.4% of the total votes and 73 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. This was also accompanied by 
a gain of 17.6% of vote total and 37 seats gained in the Italian Senate.80 More significantly however 
are the electoral victories that the party has been able to make in what were formerly non-starter 
regions. This was seen in: 
“the former ‘red belt’ of Emilia-Romagna, Marche, Tuscany, and Umbria, [where the party] 
has gone from a miniscule 1.5 percent in 2013 to 18 percent. And in southern Italy, this 
former party of northern secessionism pulled almost 8 percent of the vote.”81 
During the 2019 regional elections, the Lega was able to gain victory under a centre-right coalition 
in the southern region of Basolicata, ending 24 years of leftwing rule.82 Arguably one of the most 
prominent successes that the newly reformed party achieved came with the recent 2019 European 
elections. On the one hand, a near devastating blow was dealt to the anti-establishment Five Star 
movement where support since the general election fell from 32 to 17 percent. On the other hand, 
the Lega drastically increased from 17 percent of support to 34 percent.83 Victories such as these 
has made the party into one of the most successful far-right populist parties throughout Western 
Europe. It has also resulted in Matteo Salvini gaining greater political influence to the point where 
many consider him to be the de facto leader of Italy. 
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Even with these victories however, it cannot be said that the reformation of the Lega 
Nord was met with open arms by the entire party. Ex-leader Bossi claimed that “if Salvini brings 
the party to the South then the Lega would be over.”84 This pushback was instigated by party 
conservative hardliners who claimed that Salvini was detaching the Lega Nord from its original, 
regionalist ideals. In a way these disgruntled party representatives were justified because Salvini 
was in fact emphasizing Italian solidarity against the common European enemy. Such a discord 
is becoming more and more pertinent to Salvini, as he must find a way to reconcile the 
admittedly two different directions the party is taking at the same time: appeasing regionalist 
advocates while emphasizing national solidarity. This problem for Salvini is further exacerbated 
when looking at the actual name of the party today. Although still officially in party statute 
known as the Lega Nord, Salvini used social media to unofficially change the de facto name of 
the party to Lega (league) in hopes of attracting more central and southern Italian votes. Salvini 
has adopted for the time being what professor Roberto D’Alimonte considers to be a League “à 
la carte.” This is seen where the party runs as the Lega Nord in certain northern regional 
elections, but running as the Lega in southern regional elections.85 Although this particular 
‘tailoring to the electorate’ may breed short term political victories, the long term consequences 
on the party are still possible to occur without proper acknowledgement. 
 
 
                                                          
84 Redazione ANSA, “Salvini: 'Stop Ad Alleanza Con Alfano Anche in Lombardia' - Politica,” ANSA.it, 
May 15, 2017, https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/politica/2017/05/14/primarie-lega-sfida-salvini-fava-
militanti-al-voto-_1370d893-de03-466e-9432-2b6614ed7ed2.html. 




Through analyzing both the Lega Nord and the Lega, it is apparent that there are both 
similarities and differences between a regionalist and nationalist populist party. The obvious 
difference is in the ideology that serves as a distinction between these two parties. On the one 
hand, the Lega Nord’s regionalist platform ultimately did have a primary focus on Northern Italy 
and its secession primarily from Southern Italy. On the other hand, the transformed Lega adopted 
what was seen as a more nativist European far-right platform that focused on vilifying 
immigrants and blaming the European Union for economic and societal issues within Italy. Yet 
even with these differences, the persistent nature of populism is ever present.  
The most important aspect of this analysis has been demonstrating that the characteristics 
of populism transcends basic ideological categorization. These characteristics include the 
presence of a pivotal charismatic leadership in both the Lega Nord and Lega– Umberto Bossi 
and Matteo Salvini respectively. An assault on larger, and predominantly liberal, institutions – 
Italian government epitomized by Rome, and the European establishment being physically 
manifested by the European union. And of course one of the most important aspects that has 
always been seen is the presence of political polarization. This polarization is the main 
foundation of populism, where again we see a focus on a us vs them mentality. On the one hand, 
the Lega Nord demonstrated this by treating their regionalist centric electorate as the common 
people – the people that have been for years targeted and subjected to abuse from both 
southerners and more importantly, the corrupt elitists in Rome. On the other hand, the Lega 
maintained this same narrative with a different veneer, where the people were epitomized by 
Italians and the elitist was epitomized by the European Union. All of this works to corroborate 
the aforementioned theory of Cas Mudde’s ‘thin ideology’ along with demonstrating that Takis 
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Pappas was correct in labelling the aforementioned characteristics as commonplace, if not 
essential. 
 And in the end, while the development of Salvini’s Lega is somewhat unique, the party 
serves as a piece to the larger puzzle of the rise of European far right populism. Countries around 
Europe have seen the rise of their own vocal populist sectors. Look at the National Rally led by 
Marine Le Pen, whose inherent Euroscepticism and opposition to immigration has fed into the 
narrative of an ever present dichotomy. Even more significant is the fact that these nationalist 
populisms based parties have begun to cooperate with one another. In 2019,  
“Euroskeptic populist parties formed a new and expanded right wing alliance that 
aim[ed] to become the strongest faction in the European Parliament and seeks to 
radically transform European union policies on migration, security, family, and 
environment.”86  
This alliance would eventually be the successor of the ‘Europe of Nations and Freedom’ party 
within the European Parliament. In June of 2019, the Identity and Democracy European 
parliament party was formed and consists of heavy hitter European far-right populist parties. 
These include the Freedom party of Austria, the National Rally of France, the Alternative for 
Germany, Salvini’s League, the Party for Freedom (Netherlands), and countless others. Such 
alliances have posed a further risk to the European establishment and governing institutions 
throughout Europe. 
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 What cannot be ignored, however, is the impact the Covid-19 pandemic may have on the 
Lega and other populist powers throughout Europe. While it may be premature to determine 
whether the impact will be inherently negative, what can be said is that populism “won’t be 
killed off by this crisis. To the contrary, it flourishes in crisis.”87 What has been seen throughout 
this thesis is that successful nativist populist parties, such as the Lega, are those that are able to 
adapt and manipulate situations of crises to their advantage. More specifically, throughout this 
pandemic one can see that populist parties have utilized the foundation of thin ideology to paint 
Covid-19 as a further example of the establishment’s failure to help the people. In the spring, 
having first criticized the closure of borders, the Lega has now pivoted to “criticizing Conte’s 
government for its confinement measures, migration policies, and position in the European 
negotiations on the Recovery fund.”88 By doing so, the Lega and their coalition have reframed 
the narrative of culpability towards the ruling government, one that is allegedly to the detriment 
of the people suffering from the pandemic. Rhetoric such as this, along with the current Italian 
governmental crisis, could serve to provide far right nativist populism an opportunity to come 
into power. 
Furthermore, recent developments within Italian politics has served to further solidify the 
theory of populism/populists being a thin ideology/ideologists. With the dissipation of the Conte 
government and the rise of Draghi’s new technocratic government, Salvini threw his support 
towards the new government. This saw Lega gain an “immediate bump in its poll ratings thanks 
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to its decision to join the new, broad-based government, with support climbing .7 points over the 
past week to 24%.”89 The populist aspect of this party has resulted in a gravitation towards the 
more popular position and has raised speculation that the Lega may indeed abandon a nationalist 
rhetoric and adopt a conventional center-right position. According to Roberto D’Alimonte, “this 
is a strategic choice that will be consolidated only if things go well. If things go badly, then it is 
all over. [Salvini] will return to the nationalist camp.”90 What will happen though, remains to be 
seen.  
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